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 During the Cold War, the United States engaged in numerous clandestine interventions to 
overturn democratic political regimes for rulers that supported American interests. The CIA, 
along with the British MI6 and Iranians loyal to the Shah, executed the inaugural intervention, 
“Operation AJAX,” in 1953. AJAX was a coup d’état that removed democratically elected Prime 
Minister Muhammad Mossadeq. Mossadeq represented Iranian nationalism, as he collectivized 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that was widely viewed as exploitative by Iranians. The newly 
installed Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was supportive of Anglo-American interests. In the 
1950s, the United States launched a propaganda program in Iran that attempted to foster a belief 
among Iranians in American goodwill toward the nation, and of the benefits of an alliance with 
the US. 
 The historiography pertaining to the 1953 coup d’état in Iran explores who was 
responsible for Mossadeq’s ouster, why the U.S. intervened, and whether the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran was a consequence of the coup. These works prominently use the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes, CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt Jr.’s officially 
approved 1979 book Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, the declassified internal 
CIA history The Battle for Iran, and numerous correspondences among the US, Britain, and Iran.  
Zachary Karabell’s 1999 book, Architects of Intervention, takes the position that the British were 
most instrumental in causing the coup by taking advantage of American fears that Iran would fall 
into the Soviet sphere, pushing the U.S. to act.i Additionally, Karabell asserts that Iran was 
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divided in two camps, with one being the pro-Western and autocratic Shah and the other being 
Mossadeq’s nationalist, democratic, and reformist faction. This dichotomy validates arguments 
that the Islamic Revolution was connected to the legacy of Mossadeq, as it was the only 
alternative form of politics to the secular Shah.ii Mark Gasiorowski is one of the most prominent 
scholars in this field. In the 2004 compilation, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran, 
of which Gasiorowski was one of the editors and a contributor, he argues that the United States 
instigated the coup because of their fear of communism in the context of the Cold War.iii While 
Gasiorowski acknowledges British and Iranians as contributors, their capacity to effect change 
was limited.iv A different perspective is laid out in Darioush Bayandour’s 2010 book Iran and 
the CIA. This work maintains that Iran’s internal dynamics were a greater factor in the coup than 
the CIA or MI6, as both the Shah supporting military and clerics had abandoned Mossadeq.v 
Additionally, this work argues that the Islamic Revolution was not an effect of the coup as 
Iranians clerics had drifted to the Right and rejected much of Mossadeq’s program.vi One final 
historiographical work that warrants comment is Ervand Abrahamian’s 2013 book The Coup. 
Abrahamian argues that the coup was one of the primary forces behind the Islamic Revolution, 
and explicitly challenges Gasiorowski for perpetuating the framework that the coup was a typical 
Cold War incident where the U.S. intervened out of the fear that Communism would spread to 
Iran. This framework is flawed, according to Abrahamian, as the coup was connected to a battle 
between imperialism and nationalism, with the U.S. acting imperially to perpetuate the flow of 
oil.vii 
 In this essay, I use American correspondences about their propaganda in Iran, along with 
CIA intelligence, to show that the U.S. recognized that nationalism was distinct from 
Communism, and that the former was viewed as the true threat to Western interests in Iran. This 
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validates historian Ervand Abrahamian’s aforementioned argument that the Cold War paradigm 
is insufficient for interpreting U.S. and Iranian relations in the early 1950s. American 
propaganda in Iran was heavily discussed within the CIA, State Department, and U.S. Embassy 
in Iran. The sources prominently feature Secretary of State Dean Acheson and embassy 
ambassador Loy Henderson. Studying propaganda not only illuminates the shortcomings of the 
common policy critique that the U.S. conflated Communism with nationalism when applied to 
America’s approach to Iran, but also illuminates the role of Orientalism in the U.S. government. 
As a supplemental argument, I show that primary sources regarding the propaganda program 
reveals that government officials had a contradictory relationship with Orientalism. The U.S. 
clearly viewed Iran under an Orientalist framework, while simultaneously promoting propaganda 
that used historical knowledge of the connections between East and West to garner Iranian 
support, despite the fact that such knowledge subverted Orientalism. 
 Examining documents pertaining to propaganda from the State Department and CIA 
reveals that the United States recognized that Iranian nationalism was a tremendous threat to its 
national interests. United States propaganda in Iran was broad, using several different mediums 
to convince the population to have a more favorable view of America and Britain. Examples 
include anti-Soviet articles in Iranian magazines and anti-Soviet newsreels disseminated in 
Iranian theaters.viii The U.S. Information and Education Exchange Program (USIE) was one 
propaganda entity of the government, which published an anti-USSR cultural magazine in 
Farsi.ix Anti-Soviet propaganda was not intended solely to counter communism, but nationalism 
as well. This is because the USSR and pro-Soviet Tudeh party in Iran appealed to nationalism, 
i.e. beliefs in political economic independence and resistance to foreign influence, to provoke 
instability and gain support from those who were not communist partisans, respectively. 
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Therefore, anti-communist propaganda by the U.S. was not strictly intended to stop the spread of 
Communism, but rather to thwart Soviet propaganda that undermined U.S. interests by speaking 
to the concerns of Iranian nationalists. 
 Iranian nationalism threatened U.S. security interests in the context of the Cold War, as 
British access to Iranian oil was crucial in the event of total war with the USSR, as was the 
logistical advantage of having American military bases in the region. The U.S. embassy in Iran 
created libraries and reading rooms that sought to cultivate positive views of the West.x 
Additionally, the U.S. embassy disseminated books and pamphlets on contemporary history, 
politics, philosophy, and social science that presented the West favorably.xi These American 
textual productions targeted both literate, urban professionals and the rural population through 
direct financial aid to improve their livelihood and thus create a positive image of the US.xii 
 The U.S. recognized that Communism was not an imminent, and at times even a 
plausible threat, to take hold in Iran. CIA intelligence during the 1950s reveals that there was 
knowledge available to the U.S. government showing that the USSR was at most a limited threat 
to gain power. A 1950 CIA document that discussed the possibility of Soviet aggression in Iran 
concluded that the USSR was very unlikely to launch a ground invasion, but they were interested 
in subverting the Iranian government through propaganda and other means. The document 
maintained that for four years, Soviets had chosen to avoid invading Iran, despite border 
conflicts providing a pretense for war, which suggested they would maintain a focus on 
disrupting Iran’s internal stability.xiii The following year, the CIA was even less concerned about 
the prospect of a powerful communist movement in Iran. 
 An intelligence report from the CIA in March of 1951 informed the U.S. government that 
the communist, pro-Soviet Tudeh party was illegal in Iran, and that the oil crisis would not 
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provide them with an opportunity to even disrupt the government, let alone gain control of it.xiv 
In the event of a Tudeh uprising, the CIA was confident that the army would remain loyal to the 
Iranian government. In January of 1952, the CIA made it clear that Tudeh had both supported 
and attacked Prime Minister Mossadeq, which showed American officials that Mossadeq was not 
a puppet for Tudeh or the Soviets.xv However, the CIA did acknowledge the “possibility” of 
Tudeh to seize power or of Soviet intervention, but only if the British prolonged the crisis by 
being “unyielding,” or if there was a sudden event like the Shah’s assassination.xvi But such an 
occurrence was not an imminent threat, according to the CIA, and could have been avoided by 
the British finding a way to assuage the nationalist movement by coming to an agreement 
regarding the oil conflict. This shows that the U.S. did not mistake communism for nationalism, 
but believed the nationalist movement in Iran could create instability that opened opportunities 
for communism. Therefore, CIA intelligence emphasized countering Iranian nationalism through 
anti-communist propaganda. In March of 1952, the CIA warned that communist propaganda 
depicted “U.S. imperialism” by presenting the actions of the International Bank and NATO as 
exploitative.xvii These documents reveal that anti-communist propaganda was central to the fight 
against a potent Iranian nationalism even more so than it was intended to undermine Soviet 
influence and the spread of Communism. 
 In January of 1952, ambassador Loy Henderson wrote a telegram from the embassy in 
Iran to the State Department informing that Muhammad Mossadeq was closing US, British, and 
Soviet cultural and informational offices.xviii Since Soviet, Communist offices were not spared 
from being closed, Henderson showed the State Department that Mossadeq's regime should be 
understood as nationalist in opposing all foreign elements, including Communist ones. In a 
subsequent telegram from Henderson to Secretary of State Acheson, he cited Iranian minister 
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Kazemi who said that some foreign cultural centers “engaged in activities contrary to [the] 
interests [of] Iran.”xix In these exchanges, Henderson recognized the threat of nationalism to 
American interests and communicated his recognition to the State Department. 
 An April 1952 report from the National Security Council warned that nationalism was 
rampant among urban radicals, and urged the U.S. to produce anti-communist propaganda to 
counter that of the Soviets, which undermined American influence by appealing to nationalism. 
The document stated that “urban political groups have a radical solution: the total elimination of 
visible foreign power.”xx The document also noted that nationalism was solidified by the 
widespread recognition of U.S. ties to the UK, which was a contention supported by communist 
propaganda that presented the U.S. as exploitative.xxi The observation that communist 
propaganda was detrimental to U.S. interests by stoking nationalist sentiments more so than by 
improving the position of Tudeh or the USSR is a recurring theme in sources pertaining to the 
propaganda battle. 
 Nationalism in Iran was not confined to the urban population, and propaganda efforts 
were directed at the countryside, as well. In 1951, ambassador Wells wrote to the State 
Department that anti-communist propaganda was ineffective with the rural population, as “The 
lot of the rural population is a miserable one and the people feel that their condition could not be 
any worse under any government. Therefore, they are not at all impressed or even interested in 
out and out anti-Soviet propaganda.”xxii Instead, Wells promoted foreign aid to improve the daily 
lives of rural Iranians. It was crucial for the aid to be connected to the U.S. and seen as 
voluntarily accepted by the Iranian government.xxiii Improving people’s welfare would serve as 
propaganda to show the benefits of a relationship with the US, contrary to nationalist views of 
the U.S. as exploitative, which Soviet propaganda disseminated. Also, promoting an 
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economically stable society could prevent rural people from seeking political alternatives like the 
Tudeh or nationalism. 
 Secretary of State Acheson and Ambassador Loy Henderson both argued that propaganda 
efforts were necessary to challenge Iranian nationalist critiques of the US. In July of 1952, 
Secretary Acheson wrote a telegram to Henderson in the American embassy in Iran that 
requested their media influence should emphasize that the U.S. had no interest in the outcome of 
the oil crisis, which would have contradicted communist propaganda that presented the U.S. as 
an imperial entity.xxiv In his returning telegram, Henderson noted that the U.S. would ramp up 
Voice of America airtime to compete with the Kremlin’s use of the radio as a means of 
propaganda. American propaganda, as Henderson prescribed, would speak to Iranian nationalist 
ideals by showing “U.S. interest in aspirations of Iranian common man towards a higher standard 
of living,” that ties with the West would be most profitable for Iran, and that the U.S. was 
interested in “Iranian security and independence.”xxv This exchange demonstrates that the U.S. 
was not mistaking nationalism for communism, but recognized that communist propaganda 
spoke to Iranian nationalists and was a thorn for American national interests. 
 A March 3, 1953 commentary on Tudeh’s position in Iran is revealing of the complex 
relationship among nationalism, communism, and Mossadeq within the intelligence community. 
The document reveals that the Tudeh party was not interested in gaining power within the 
Iranian government, as it was previously believed in the CIA. The report stated, “Current Tudeh 
attempts to exploit the confused situation in Iran suggest that the Communists are not ready for 
an all-out assault on the government, but believe that Mossadeq’s continuation in power will best 
serve their interest in what they regard as a ‘maturing revolutionary situation.’”xxvi This 
conclusion that Tudeh would not attempt to take over the government because they saw 
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Mossadeq’s rule as conducive to their long-term interests was complemented by the position 
that, “The diverse nature and conflicting interest of the forces opposing Mossadeq would 
undermine any government brought to power by his defeat and would presumably present the 
Tudeh with a new chance to further its aim of obtaining control of the government.”xxvii This 
position of the CIA shows concerns that Mossadeq’s ouster could actually improve the position 
of Tudeh, and therefore the USSR, to gain control in Iran. Such a view undermines simplistic 
interpretations of the coup against Mossadeq as an effort to weaken communist influence. 
 United States propaganda in Iran was much more easily promulgated with the support of 
Shah Pahlavi and Prime Minister Zahedi after the successful coup d’état. In September of 1953, 
Theodore C. Streibert of the State Department wrote a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Iran 
stating that propaganda efforts with the newly installed Iranian government should focus on 
assuaging nationalist concerns about American imperialism. Streibert advised that Voice of 
America and other entities should emphasize “Allaying Iranian distrust of ‘outsiders’ (U.S. in 
this case) by repeating and reiterating sole interest U.S. in Iran is in free, independent, 
strengthened Iran capable taking her place in community free nations [sic].”xxviii Such an 
emphasis countered nationalist arguments that the U.S. sought domination like other Western 
imperialists. In the same telegram, Streibert recognized that the U.S. needed to present itself as 
supportive of the program advocated by Iranian nationalists. Towards this end, propaganda 
outlets released positive statements about Iran harnessing their own natural resources.xxix 
Additionally, Edward C. Wells wrote a cable from the U.S. embassy in Iran to the USIS in 
response to Streibert’s recommendations stating that they would also focus propaganda toward 
showing that Iranian leaders and the public voluntarily chose an alliance with the U.S. to meet 
their national interests.xxx Both of these documents reveal that American officials recognized the 
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enduring strength of Iranian nationalism after the coup, and attempted to present the U.S. as 
supportive of Iranians’ ideals for autonomy. 
 Post-coup U.S. propaganda that was anti-communist and anti-Soviet was intertwined with 
countering Iranian nationalism, as it was prior to the coup. In a memo from Edward C. Wells to 
the United States Information Agency, he noted that the U.S. needed to challenge Communist 
activities that labeled U.S. policies in Iran as “economic imperialism,” which resonated with 
Iranian nationalists due to the conflict with Britain.xxxi To counter Communist charges, Wells 
argued that local presses and radio stations should show that U.S. aid had numerous concrete 
accomplishments and therefore should not be misconstrued as economically imperialist.xxxii This 
example shows that anti-communist propaganda was tied to countering nationalism because the 
USSR promulgated nationalist sentiments to undermine the U.S. and the West. The arguments 
that Wells made were consistent with the National Security Council’s 1954 report on U.S. 
objectives and policies in the Near East. This document stated that anti-British and anti-French 
nationalism was a potent force, which threatened U.S. interests through American ties with 
Europe.xxxiii Like Wells suggested, the NSC emphasized economic aid as a propaganda tool to 
counter anti-Americanism.xxxiv 
 To summarize, the CIA, State Department, and Iranian Embassy records reveal that there 
was widespread recognition that the nationalist movement in Iran was the paramount concern for 
officials. Between 1950 and 1953, the risk of Soviet intervention or influence, or of Tudeh 
making a power grab, was not an imminent danger. According to documents pertaining to 
propaganda, the imminent danger in Iran was nationalist policies, not a Communist take over. 
Nationalist policies and beliefs undermined British access to petroleum, America’s ability to 
establish military bases, and made suspect foreign presence in Iran by the US, Western Europe, 
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and the USSR. CIA intelligence between 1950 and 1953 maintained that nationalism in Iran was 
a powerful force, and that Communist propaganda from the USSR was effective in critiquing 
Anglo-America as imperialists. These views were shared by the State Department and the U.S. 
embassy in Iran, and they advocated numerous forms of anti-communist propaganda to challenge 
its critique of Western exploitation that appealed to nationalists by articulating the benefits of a 
relationship with Anglo-America. 
 Another revealing aspect of propaganda documents is the complex relationship between 
the American government and ideas of Orientalism. The concept “Orientalism” has been 
prominent in scholarship in Middle East Studies since Edward Said’s 1979 book of the same 
name. In Said’s work, he defined Orientalism as a body of knowledge developed by European 
intellectuals that was conducive to colonizing the Middle East. This body of knowledge argued 
that people from the “East” were essentially different from Europeans of the “West.” East and 
West were defined as cohesive cultural entities in Orientalism, with their respective people 
possessing opposite qualities. Prominent Western qualities included rationality and the 
concomitant capacity for self-rule, while Eastern qualities included irrationality, emotionalism, 
and a backwards or traditional outlook that prevented their historical progress and self-rule. 
Therefore, the East’s inability to govern themselves with stability justified Western intervention. 
During the Cold War, Orientalist ideas pervaded American governmental documents discussing 
propaganda efforts to guide Iran toward a relationship with the U.S. and Britain. However, the 
primary sources reveal that the U.S. was aware of the limitations of Orientalist ideas in pursuing 
national interests through propaganda. American propaganda in Iran often presented the East and 
West as having shared values and historical connections that undermined the central Orientalist 
premise of essential differences between peoples.  
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 United States government documents also have information pertaining to intellectual 
history and Orientalism. Many scholars, most notably Ervand Abrahamian have noted that 
American officials had an Orientalist view of Iran, like the rest of the Middle East, during the 
Cold War.xxxv Such an outlook considered people in the Middle East as inherently different from 
the West, due to qualities like irrationality and emotionalism. One prominent example of 
Orientalism in the American government is in Loy Henderson’s 1951 telegram to the State 
Department pertaining to Voice of America (VOA) propaganda. Henderson emphasized that 
VOA propaganda would present the U.S. as sympathetic to Iranian’s aspirations, but their actions 
during the oil crisis prevented Americans from offering aid because they were “swept by 
emotions” and taking “somewhat rash actions and rather unreasoning attitude.”xxxvi Another 
Orientalist perspective was prominently espoused in a 1952 State Department memo about useful 
propaganda measures in the Muslim world. It is important to note that the document often 
conflates “Arab” with Muslim, and does not delineate distinctions among Arabs, Iranians, and 
Turks, so many of the passages that discuss “Arabs” are applicable to Iranians. 
 This 1952 document encapsulated an Orientalist view in the passage, stating, “We should 
be careful to see, in tailoring our cultural program, that it fits the point of view of the Arabs and 
that it is suited to their outlook and susceptibility and not what we project upon them… The Arab 
thinks of himself as a member of a group, or as a whole as a religious or social group… and so 
we have to keep that in mind when we are sending our material out into the area and we don’t 
make the mistake of treating the Arab as if he were an American.”xxxvii This passage presents 
people from the Middle East as different by having a “collective” mentality that prevents them 
from being receptive to arguments and propaganda that would appeal to Americans. 
Additionally, this State Department document feared that USSR propaganda was effective 
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because people from the Middle East are emotional, and do not reason with logic.xxxviii Loy 
Henderson prepared a dispatch for the State Department that discussed an editorial prepared for 
the New York Times, Time, and Newsweek about Mossadeq’s policies. This editorial article 
presented Mossadeq in Orientalist terms as “wily,” and reckless in destroying the Iranian 
economy through an embargo with the British. Similar distinctions between people from the East 
and West are apparent in CIA records. 
 American Orientalism is evident in the 1953 document, The Battle for Iran. This work 
was an internal history of, and for, the CIA, written by Dr. Donald Wilber and released three 
times (1981, 2011, 2014) to the public with varying excisions. One example of Orientalism in 
this CIA history is its discussion of Iranian people as tending to be “talkative” and its depiction 
of Mossadeq’s actions as “bizarre and irrational.”xxxix However, this work’s description of 
Mossadeq’s irrationality also pays such methods compliment as being “calculated” towards 
nationalist ends.xl This example is illustrative of the complex relationship between Orientalism 
and American policies in Iran. The U.S. was able to view Mossadeq as both irrational and 
calculating, and was similarly able to view Iranians as essentially different, all the while 
promulgating their sameness with America and the West in propaganda. 
 American propaganda in Iran presented connections between the Middle East, Islamic 
culture, and the West. Such propaganda is notable for historians because an emphasis on 
similarities among Iran, the US, and Britain contradicts the Orientalist view of essential 
differences between the East and West, prominent in official documents. One particular program 
promoted by the State Department in 1952 emphasized Avicenna as exemplifying the 
connections between the East and West. Aware that Iran was celebrating the one thousandth 
anniversary of Avicenna, the U.S. wanted to produce materials that showed how Avicenna 
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influenced European and Western intellectual history.xli This is noteworthy, because critiques of 
Orientalism during the Cold War, usually discoverable in Area Studies programs, deny the 
connections between Middle Eastern and European history. Denying historical interaction is 
conducive to the argument that military, economic, and political strength in the U.S. and Europe 
was a product of their inherent cultural ability, and therefore people from the Middle East were 
not contributors to Western growth and progress.xlii So while U.S. sources do discuss Iranians, 
along with the rest of the Middle East, in Orientalist terms as irrational or different, the 
propaganda effort interestingly uses historical knowledge that subverts Orientalist views by 
showing past connections between the East and West. Additionally, the propaganda that made 
use of Avicenna was a challenge to Soviet attempts to emphasize Avicenna as an Uzbek, with 
ties to Russian history. This program was intended to depict Russian cultural affinity with Iran, 
much like the U.S. was doing.xliii The State Department also helped publish an article in the 
“Times on Sunday” about the American Friends of the Middle East organization that was 
offering a fellowship to travel to the Holy Land for whomever wrote the best essay for the topic, 
“The Impact of Islam on Christianity.”xliv This essay contest, like propaganda using the figure of 
Avicenna, showed that the East and West were not essentially different, but influenced each 
other, which contradicted the Orientalist perspectives found in internal government documents. 
 Another example of American propaganda that stressed Iran’s cultural affinity with the 
U.S. was the “Voices of God” brochure. Loy Henderson discussed the brochure in a 1953 
dispatch to the State Department. The brochure had a mosque on its cover, and was filled with 
illustrative quotations from the Koran, the Persian poet Hafez, Jesus Christ, and Abraham 
Lincoln, among others.xlv Such a juxtaposition presented figures central to Islamic and Iranian 
history as having a shared message with individuals who are at the core of U.S. and European 
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history. By including religious figures, the brochure also depicted the U.S. and Iran as connected 
through their difference from the USSR and their state atheism.  
 An Orientalist perspective of Iranians is evident when reading the CIA and State 
Department records. Government exchanges that discussed effective means of propaganda 
accepted Orientalist premises that Iranians were irrational and easily swayed by emotions. 
Defining Iranians in such a way suggested to Americans that the situation in Iran was 
exceptionally precarious, as the people were susceptible to Soviet propaganda that evoked 
nationalist passions, which would undermine U.S. interests. However, declassified documents 
also reveal that U.S. propaganda relied on arguments that actually undermined Orientalist ideas 
by showing commonalities between the West and Iran. American propaganda in Iran 
promulgated the historical knowledge that the Abbasid Caliphate shaped Western intellectual 
history as exemplified by the figure of Avicenna, highlighted shared values by religious and 
historical individuals as in the “Voices of God” brochure, and emphasized shared cultural 
incompatibility with state atheism.  
 In conclusion, a study of American propaganda in Iran provides valuable insights into 
government perceptions of the nation. One common critique of U.S. Cold War policies, and of 
its interventions in particular, is that the U.S. government conflated nationalist movements with 
doctrinaire Communist revolutions that were neither connected to the USSR or destined to result 
in a fruitful alliance with the Soviets. Examining propaganda documents pertaining to Iran 
between 1950-1954 reveals that such a critique of American policy does not always neatly apply. 
The CIA and State Department were fully aware of widespread Iranian hostility toward the 
USSR due to its past colonial presence. With this awareness, U.S. government officials like Loy 
Henderson noted a distinction between nationalism and Communism, most prominently 
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manifested in the Tudeh party. U.S. intelligence generally recognized that Tudeh and the Soviets 
had little chance of taking control over the government. However, Iranian nationalism 
represented a tremendous threat to the U.S. largely because oil collectivization would cut off 
Britain, making America’s key Cold War ally economically and militarily weaker. Despite 
Communism being less than an imminent threat, the U.S. was deeply concerned about Soviet 
propaganda that spoke to nationalists by critiquing Anglo-America as economically imperialist. 
Therefore, anti-Soviet propaganda by the U.S. was not aimed so much at thwarting Communism, 
but nationalism. 
 American propaganda in Iran constituted textual productions like brochures and 
pamphlets, radio, financial aid, and other means. Propaganda was broadly directed at both the 
urban and rural population, reflecting U.S. recognition of how widespread Iranian nationalism 
was. To challenge nationalism, which attacked the idea that a relationship with the U.S. and 
Britain could be equal and beneficial, the U.S. Embassy in Iran and State Department produced 
propaganda that asserted Western cultural affinities and historical connections with Iran. Such 
propaganda is particularly noteworthy because its underlying arguments undermined Orientalist 
ideas that premised perceptions of Iran within the U.S. government. State, embassy, and 
intelligence records show that Iranians and Mossadeq were viewed as lacking reason and being 
overly emotional in their actions, which was antithetical to Western and American qualities. Yet, 
American propaganda reveals that there must have been knowledge that such Orientalist ideas 
were flawed, because U.S. officials used evidence of historical commonalities and connections 
with Iran to further their national interests. 
 Analysis of American propaganda is a valuable lens through which scholars can discern 
U.S. perceptions of Iranians’ actions, recognition of the threat of nationalism, and means of 
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influencing a foreign population. The State Department, CIA, and American embassy all 
recognized that nationalism was distinct from Communism and was the primary threat to U.S. 
interests in Iran. An interesting question for future scholarship to explore is how pervasive was 
the view that nationalism was a greater threat than Communism in Iran within the Eisenhower 
administration and his inner circle? Also, were there comparable regions where the U.S. 
recognized that nationalism was not identical to Communism, contradicting the Cold War 
paradigm? Another topic that studying American propaganda raises is the influence and 
acceptance of Orientalism as a body of knowledge within the U.S. government. As shown in this 
essay, American officials held many Orientalist premises that were contradicted by the 
knowledge at the root of their propaganda efforts. This raises questions of how significant 
Orientalism was to U.S. policymakers, and whether or not “on the ground” realities altered 
Americans’ acceptance of Orientalist ideas in Iran and the greater Middle East. 
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